Introduction
Under the US Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), a company that files for protection under Chapter 11 is frequently referred to as "Debtor-in-Possession" (DIP hereafter).
The filing enables a financially distressed firm to restructure its financial and operational base. However, given the repayment uncertainties created by such a filing, few lenders are willing to extend the additional loans usually needed for a successful reorganization. The Code (under Section 364) addresses these lending disincentives by providing special creditor rights to post-petition loans. These loans are usually referred to as DIP financing and the lender providing such financing can get superior seniority and enhanced security that is not available outside the bankruptcy context. Further, DIP loans have to be completely paid off before the borrower can emerge from Chapter 11.
Although DIP financing has been available since the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, it was not until the wave of bankruptcies in the early 1990s that DIP financing grew in size and importance. DIP financing has come to play an increasingly important role in the reorganization process of financially distressed firms, yet little work has examined it in detail.
A large and growing debate in the law and economics literature centers on the merits and drawbacks of senior and secured financing in general, and on DIP financing in particular. On the negative side, arguments against secured financing such as DIP loans, note that such credit provides incentives for managers to undertake risky, possibly negative NPV projects (the overinvestment problem). 1 Bebchuk and
1 The risk-shifting incentives are analyzed in detail by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . White (1994) provides an overview of the secured credit debate. Kanda and Levmore (1994) discuss the risk shifting caused by secured borrowing in general, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) and Triantis (1993) discuss the investment incentives to overinvest created by DIP financing in particular. Fried (1996) and Warren (1996) highlight ways in which pledging of assets to new secured lenders can lead to a transfer of wealth from existing unsecured creditors to new secured creditors, particularly when firms are in distress. On the other hand, Stulz and Johnson (1985) and Schwartz (1997) , point out the merits of secured financing as it allows the borrower to undertake positive NPV projects that might be passed up in the absence of senior and secured credit such as DIP financing.
A related question is whether DIP financing prolongs the reorganization process or whether it facilitates a faster conclusion of the bankruptcy legal process. The length of the process can be important because it can affect the eventual outcome (emergence from bankruptcy or liquidation) as well as the value of the firm's assets.
The final outcome and the length of the reorganization process may in turn depend on whether DIP financing is provided by an existing lender or by a lender with no previous outstanding loans. The information benefits enjoyed by a lender with prior claims can affect both the likelihood of a firm emerging from Chapter 11, as well as its time spent in bankruptcy.
We address the following specific questions empirically: (i) What distinguishes firms that obtain DIP financing from firms that do not? (ii) How is DIP financing related to the probability and speed of bankruptcy resolution? (iii) Does it make a difference if the DIP financier is an existing creditor with a prior lending relationship with the firm? To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first empirical investigation of these issues. 2 Related work on DIP financing includes Carapeto (1999) , Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramírez (1997) , Dhillon, Noe and Ramírez (1995) , and John and Vasudevan (1995) . Carapeto studies the impact of DIP financing on recovery rates and management turnover. Chatterjee et al. examine the impact of DIP financing announcement in the borrower's market value and report a positive excess return for both equity and bond holders around the date of DIP loan announcement. John and Vasudevan present a theoretical To answer these questions we gather a large and comprehensive sample of over 500 firms that filed for Chapter 11, together with the details of any DIP financing that they obtained. Our results show that larger firms are more likely to obtain DIP financing. This result seems intuitive given that DIP financiers receive superpriority on the underlying assets. We also find that firms, which obtain DIP financing, are more likely to emerge from the Chapter 11 process than firms, which do not. These results are consistent with DIP lenders playing a screening role in which they are able to identify distressed firms that are strong and likely to emerge quickly, as well as a monitoring role in which the DIP lenders help firms to emerge quickly.
Interestingly, firms that receive DIP financing take a shorter time to resolve their Chapter 11 filing. This applies both to reorganizations leading to eventual emergence from Chapter 11 as well as to those leading to liquidations. The shortened time to liquidations, in particular, is supportive of a monitoring role rather than a pure screening role for DIP lenders. It suggests that DIP lenders finance positive NPV projects and help the company emerge from bankruptcy, but if things do not go well with the firm then they are quick to liquidate to preserve the value of the underlying assets.
We next examine the identity of the DIP lenders (whether insiders with prior lending relationships or outsiders) and how this affects the time in bankruptcy and resolution outcome. 3 We find that while many firms receive DIP financing from an existing lender, a significant number obtain it from a lender with whom they have no analysis where DIP financing has a screening effect, improving the probability of successful reorganization.
They also predict that announcements of DIP financing by firms in Chapter 11 should lead to positive price effects for both equity and debt (see also, Dhillon, Noe and Ramírez, 1995) .
3 Gilson (1990) and Gilson, John and Lang (1990) The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we briefly describe the DIP financing process and features of this form of financing. Section 3 describes the testable hypotheses. Section 4 provides the details of the data and sample selection.
The main results, their interpretations, and robustness checks are contained in Section 5. Section 6 sums up our conclusions.
The DIP Financing Process
Although the existing management of a firm filing for Chapter 11 frequently retains control over the business operations and the reorganization process, major decisions (including the decision to obtain DIP financing) require prior approval by the bankruptcy court. 4 The DIP financing approval process usually involves two steps.
In the first step (assuming the debtor already has a lender willing to provide DIP financing), the debtor makes a motion for authorization to obtain credit (pursuant to Federal Bankruptcy Rule 4001 (c)(1)). This motion is usually filed either simultaneously with the Chapter 11 filing or shortly thereafter. (For our sample, over 60% of the firms obtain DIP financing within 30 days of filing for Chapter 11). The court does not commence a final hearing on this motion for at least a 15-day period, during which other existing creditors of the firm can respond to this motion.
However, most motions contain a request for an interim hearing. This hearing authorizes immediate borrowing of a limited amount "only to the extent necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm to the estate pending a final hearing," (the Federal Bankruptcy Rule 4001 (c)(2)). Thus, in most cases, the debtor is able to get a limited amount of DIP funding right away.
The next step in the process to obtain DIP financing involves the entry of a "permanent" or "final" financing order by the court, which authorizes the borrowing of the full amount of the lender's commitment. This occurs after the court has heard arguments from other creditors who may object to such financing. These arguments can affect the final size and terms of the approved DIP financing.
DIP financing is governed by Section 364, which has four subsections.
Subsections (a) through (d) provide an increasing level of priority and security for the DIP lender. While no court approval is needed for financing under 364(a), it is needed for financing under 364(b). The main implication of this is that financing under 364(a) is more likely to be challenged by other creditors. In both cases the credit is 4 This section draws heavily on Kohn, Solow and Taber (1995) and Rosen, Gardner, Miller and Basta (1998). unsecured, but within the class of unsecured loans it has the first priority along with other administrative claims such as professional fees and costs of administering the estate of the firm. In most cases this level of security is not enough to induce lenders to provide new loans (see e.g., Moore, 1990 
Testable hypotheses

Relationship between DIP lending and bankruptcy outcome
The incentives for equity holders of a financially distressed firm to shift into riskier, negative NPV projects are well known. Given their superpriority status, if the DIP financiers are fully secured, they may have little incentive to carry out costly screening/monitoring of the borrower and may allow overinvestment in riskier (even negative NPV) projects. The alternative hypothesis is that DIP financing leads to positive net present value projects that increase the likelihood of reorganization. In this case, the ability to offer secured DIP credit benefits all security holders. 6 Our first test is whether DIP financing is associated with the increased probability of successful emergence from bankruptcy.
Relationship between DIP financing and speed of bankruptcy resolution
DIP financing can affect the value of the firm in various ways, through its effect on the speed of bankruptcy resolution. The length of the process can be important because it can affect the value of the assets of the firm. 7 For instance, DIP financing 6 In related work, Chatterjee et al. (1997) conduct an event study to measure the impact of DIP loan announcements on the prices of both the equity as well as the existing bonds of the borrower. They find a significant and positive excess return for the stock as well as the bonds following the DIP loan announcement. These results further support our claim that DIP is used to finance positive NPV projects.
Our results also shed light on the avenues through which DIP financiers can add value. 7 The direct and indirect costs of financial distress have been examined by a number of researchers. Bergman and Callen (1991) shorter time to liquidation.
The role of prior relationships in DIP lending
DIP financing can be obtained from two sources: either from an existing lender (insider) or from a new lender (outsider) with whom the borrower has no prior relationship. There are two main differences between insiders and outsiders. First, since an insider is an existing creditor to the firm, it cares about its total claims, and not merely about the DIP loan. Second, the inside bank lender has access to private information about the borrower that it has acquired through past monitoring and information gathering. 8 We examine the implications of the differences between insiders and outsiders.
If an inside bank were to finance negative NPV projects then the value of its existing claims would deteriorate. Hence inside DIP lenders will not finance management threatens to run down firm assets. Empirically, Weiss and Wruck (1998) document such wealth destruction in the case of Eastern Airlines' reorganization process. 8 The role of a bank as monitor and information producer is widely modeled in the finance literature. See, for example, Campbell and Kracaw (1980), Diamond (1984) , James (1987) , Puri (1999) .
negative NPV projects, thereby minimizing any concerns of overinvestment. An outside DIP lender, on the other hand, is only concerned about the value of its DIP loan and as long it is covered, it has few incentives to monitor the borrower (see debate and related citations in the first section). Hence, if DIP financing were to promote overinvestment, this would likely be lower for the firms that obtain DIP financing from their existing borrowers. This fact in turn implies that firms which obtain DIP financing from prior lenders are more likely to emerge from bankruptcy than firms that obtain DIP financing from an outside lender.
However, if there is little systematic overinvestment then we should see no difference in the probability of emergence from bankruptcy for inside and outside DIP financing. This provides an additional test of the overinvestment hypothesis for DIP financing.
For a DIP loan of any given size, the value of total claims (prior loans and the DIP loan) for an inside bank with prior claims outstanding is more sensitive to the value of the underlying assets than the claims of an outside lender (with only the DIP loan). Inside banks therefore have an incentive to finance companies that are likely to reorganize faster. Further, an inside lender is more likely to have the private information necessary to identify such firms and to facilitate a faster reorganization of these firms due to the incentives mentioned above. In such a case, we should see inside DIP financed firms reorganizing faster than those financed by outsiders. Hence we test if inside DIP financing is associated with (i) a faster successful emergence from Chapter 11, and (ii) shorter time to liquidation.
Data and sample selection
In assembling the sample of firms that obtained DIP financing we first use the
Bankruptcy DataSource from New Generation Research Inc. (NGR), which includes
financial and reorganization information on major public firms that filed for Chapter 11. We identify all the firms that filed for Chapter 11 protection between January 1988 and December 1997 yielding a list of 685 filings (multiple filings by the same firm are treated as separate filings.) We then identify the industry of the debtors by checking its primary SIC code as reported by Bankruptcy DataSource and, when SIC code was not available, we obtain it from Compustat. We exclude the financial services firms such as depository institutions, insurance companies, non-banking financial firms and real estate firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999). We also exclude the six Chapter 11 filings caused by asbestos and silicon implant litigation, as these were largely of a non-financial nature and the reorganization processes involved negotiation with a large number of tort claimants. This reduces the sample to 548 firms.
We then use a two-stage process to identify the subset of firms that obtained DIP financing. We first use the Dealscan database from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC), which contains publicly available information on over 50,000 corporate loans booked since 1986. The database provides the name of the lead lender as well as the details of loans (purpose, size, maturity etc.). The details on the purpose of the loan are contained under pre-defined data fields, including the field: "Debtor-in-Possession."
By searching under this field we generate a sample of loans meant primarily for Debtor-in-Possession financing. For the 10-year period of our study, we generate a primary sample of 166 cases in which DIP credit was obtained by 107 firms that filed for Chapter 11 in this period. However, the Dealscan database is not a complete and comprehensive source of all loans. We supplement this list by searching the Dow Jones News Retrieval system 9 The number of credit facilities is larger than the number of firms for two reasons. First, the DIP financing to a single borrower can consist of multiple facilities such as term loans and revolvers. Second, some of the firms renew their DIP facilities if the existing facilities mature before they are able to exit Chapter 11.
and the Lexis-Nexis business news section for the key words "Debtor-in-Possession financing," "DIP financing," and "post-petition financing" to flush our relevant stories. For robustness we also search the news stories for each firm around the date of its Chapter 11 filing and its SEC filings for any mention of DIP financing. This step allows us to confirm the accuracy of the Dealscan information, and to find additional instances of DIP financing that are not included in the Dealscan database.
We were able to confirm the Dealscan DIP financing for 93 of the 107 firms. This search also yields news stories of DIP financing for 58 firms that were not covered by the Dealscan database. Thus, our final sample consists of 165 firms that received DIP financing. We found some indication of post-petition financing arrangements for an additional 10 firms but they were excluded from the sample because we could not confirm the information. This left us with a total sample of 538 Chapter 11 filings, of which 165 received DIP financing.
The data on the financial characteristics of the sample firms is for the last fiscal year before the year of bankruptcy filing. It is obtained primarily from Compustat and when not available, we used Bankruptcy DataSource, Disclosure and 10-K filings. The dates of the Chapter 11 filing, plan confirmation, and emergence from Chapter 11, liquidation or reorganization are taken from Bankruptcy DataSource and Lexis-Nexis. To estimate the time taken for the resolution of the reorganization process we use the date of the confirmation of the plan by the bankruptcy court as the date of the final resolution of the reorganization process. However, a significant number of firms, mostly non-DIP, had no formal confirmation date as they either liquidated piecemeal via asset sales or were acquired outright. For these firms we use the date on which a significant asset sale or acquisition was approved by the bankruptcy court as the date of the resolution of the reorganization process. 10 In a few cases we are able to locate only the filing date for a liquidation plan with the bankruptcy court and if no other information was available, we used that date as the end point for the reorganization process. We also check the Directory of Obsolete Securities to find the final resolution of the Chapter 11 filing, and augment our sample outcomes accordingly. The Directory of Obsolete Securities lists charter cancellations, and firms that are dissolved or dismissed, which we treat as liquidations. Finally, for some firms we are unable to locate any resolution date.
In order to examine the role of the prior (pre-petition) lender in providing DIP financing, the identities of both the pre-petition and the DIP creditors is required.
These are obtained primarily from the Dealscan database, and were confirmed and supplemented through news stories and SEC filings. Of the 154 filings for which we were able to locate the DIP lender as well as the prepetition lender, 89 (58%) obtained DIP loans from their existing lenders.
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The calendar time distribution of firms filing for Chapter 11 and the subset that received DIP financing is illustrated in Table 1 . There is a clustering of filings for the period 1990-1992, a period of recession for the US economy. Table 1 also reports the fraction of total filings that received DIP financing for each year, showing an increasing trend over the sample period. For the first half of the sample period, fewer than 20% percent of firms filing for Chapter 11 received DIP financing, while this 10 The advantage of this approach is the consistency across firms. The disadvantage is that if the resolution period extends beyond the first date of the asset sale we understate the resolution time. However insofar as we are consistent in our approach across DIP and non-DIP financed firms this is unlikely to bias our results in any manner. 11 For the subsample for which we have data the DIP loan amount to total assets ratio is 20.11% for inside DIP financed firms and 20.60% for outside DIP financed firms.
proportion rises to over 30% for the later half of the sample period, reflecting the growing importance of the DIP market.
We further examine whether the time trend in DIP financing is a secular trend, or if it reflects a change in the composition and characteristics of firms filing for Chapter 11. We examine a number of firm characteristics and find that over time those filing for Chapter 11 have smaller total assets as well as smaller current assets. This suggests that it is important to control for such changes in firm characteristics over time when conducting our tests.
Methodology and results
Characteristics of firms obtaining DIP financing
We first investigate which firm characteristics are related to its ability to obtain DIP financing, after controlling for other factors. Table 2 gives univariate tests for the differences in means and medians. The variables that we examine are the firm's total assets, its leverage (defined as ratio of total liabilities to total assets), ratio of its current assets to total assets, and whether or not its filing was a prepackaged bankruptcy. The univariate tests suggest that larger firms (with more assets) receive DIP financing more often than smaller firms. The univariate tests also indicate that firms obtaining DIP financing have, on average, relatively less leverage (Liabilities/Assets) and more current assets (Current Assets/Assets) than those not obtaining such financing. These results seem reasonable since larger firms typically have better access to capital markets. Also, the higher level of current assets may imply that those firms which are working capital intensive are more likely to seek and get DIP financing. Another possible explanation is a preference for current assets as collateral for DIP financing (see e.g., Rohman, 1990, and Rizzi, 1991) .
While the univariate tests are suggestive, it is useful to conduct a multivariate test.
We estimate a Probit regression model of the following form:
The variables are briefly defined below:
DIP: The dependent variable in the model is equal to one if the firm i obtained DIP financing, zero otherwise.
LOGASSET: The natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the last year before the date of filing for Chapter 11.
LEVERAGE: The ratio calculated by dividing the sum of the long-term debt and current liabilities by the total assets.
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PREPAK: A dummy variable that takes the value one if the filing was a prepackaged
Chapter 11 filing, zero otherwise.
POST1992: A dummy variable that takes the value one if the Chapter 11 filing took place in the period 1992-1997, zero otherwise.
RETAIL: A dummy variable that takes the value one if the primary SIC code reported in the Chapter 11 filing is in the range 5200-5999.
CA/TA: The ratio of current assets to total assets of the firm.
In all cases the accounting data is for the last fiscal year before the year of the Chapter 11 filing. The impact of the size of the firm's assets on its likelihood to obtain DIP financing is measured by LOGASSET. Assuming that asset size proxies for available collateral, we would expect to find a positive coefficient for the LOGASSET. We conduct robustness checks using two other variables instead of total assets. We use current assets alone (as opposed to the ratio of current assets to total assets) as a measure of liquid collateral instead of total assets, and find similar 12 We define the leverage ratio as the summation of long-term debt and current liabilities to total assets, rather than just the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. One reason for this is to take in to account that in some instances of default, Compustat records the long-term debt as 0 and treats the long-term debt as current liabilities. Our measure of leverage mitigates the effect of any such recording bias by Compustat. results. We also use Net Property, Plant and Equipment (NPPE) as a proxy for size both in addition to and as a substitute for LOGASSET. We find that NPPE is not a significant determinant of DIP financing, and hence do not include it in our regressions. The variable LEVERAGE captures the capital structure of the debtor.
This variable could influence the firm's ability to obtain DIP financing, as a higher level of existing debt may hamper the firm's ability to obtain new debt. A prepackaged filing requires the firm to file a plan of reorganization that has been agreed to by all claim classes at the time of filing for Chapter 11. As reported by Tashijian, Lease and McConnell (1996) a prepackaged filing leads to a significantly shorter stay in the reorganization process for the debtor. A debtor filing for a prepackaged reorganization plan is unlikely to require DIP financing due to a shorter anticipated stay in the reorganization process. We therefore expect to find a negative coefficient for the PREPAK variable (though some prepaks do receive DIP financing).
We control for the historical growth of DIP financing by including the dummy variable POST1992. Since the DIP financing business has grown rapidly in the last few years, the debtor filing for Chapter 11 in the later half of the sample period is more likely to get DIP financing. The retail industry produced a relatively large fraction of high profile DIP financing (Macy's, Federated, Ames and Carter Hawley
Hale Stores are some of the examples). Further, a large number of firms filing for bankruptcy arrange DIP financing in order to reassure trade creditors and customers of their continued access to liquid funds, which can be quite important in the retail industry. Rohman (1990) and Rizzi (1991) discuss the special attraction of retail firms to DIP lenders. Thus retailers have a tendency to have a higher demand for DIP financing. This is also reflected in the fact that over 25% of retail firms in Chapter 11
in our sample get DIP financing. Hence we include a dummy variable for the retail industry as a control in our model specification.
Results for the Probit model are reported on Table 3 , panel A. The negative intercept shows that the "typical" firm does not emerge from Chapter 11. The results
show that the larger firms are more likely to obtain DIP financing, as are retail firms, firms with more current assets, and firms filing for Chapter 11 in the later half of the sample period. 13 Prepackaged filings are less likely to obtain DIP financing. This is intuitively appealing as the prepackaged filings are accompanied by a pre-approved plan of reorganization. Thus, in most prepackaged filings the borrower continues to have access to its existing credit lines, which obviates the need to obtain DIP financing. The coefficient for leverage is negative though not statistically significant.
A firm's ability to obtain DIP financing is positively related to the ratio of current assets to total assets. This provides some support for the view that DIP lenders prefer to lend against liquid collateral. This result is also consistent with working capital intensive firms having higher demand for DIP financing.
We next examine whether firms financed by inside DIP lenders have different characteristics compared to firms financed by outside DIP lenders. We run a Probit model within the sample of DIP financed firms with the dependent variable equal to one if the DIP financing is provided by the firm's prepetition lender and zero if it is provided by a new lender. The results are reported in Table 3 , panel B. We find that prepackaged filings that receive DIP financing are likely to receive it from their existing lenders. This result is not surprising given that the prepackaged filings are characterized by the concurrent filing of a plan of reorganization already approved by existing creditors. The coefficient for LOGASSET is negative and significant, as is 13 One could argue that the ability to get DIP financing can depend on the size of the loan (lender's exposure) requested relative to the size of the firm. To take account of this, for the subsample of firms for which the DIP amount is available, we rerun the regression using the ratio of the DIP loan to total assets as the dependent variable. Our results are very similar.
the coefficient for CA/TA. One possible explanation is that the most advantageous/cheapest source of financing for smaller firms is their pre-existing lenders. The results are also consistent with the conjecture that insiders lend more frequently to small firms for which they are at an informational advantage. As prior lenders, they are also more likely to finance prepackaged filings. These results emphasize the differences between obtaining DIP financing from inside lenders versus outside lenders.
Relationship between DIP financing and bankruptcy outcomes
The next question we address is whether DIP lending is related to emergence from the legal bankruptcy process. We use the following Probit model to examine this.
EMERGE, the dependent variable, equals one if the firm i emerged either as an independent entity or was acquired by or merged with another firm. The dependent variable is equal to zero if the firm converted its filing to Chapter 7, liquidated or if there is no news of the firm having emerged.
14 We explain the reasons for the inclusion of the independent variables before moving on to the main results. A firm's industry may be material, as the costs of financial distress may differ from one industry to another. We also include the log of the firm's assets and leverage as controls, since these might hamper the firm's ability to emerge from bankruptcy. Further, as noted earlier, over time the number of firms with smaller total and current assets filing for bankruptcy has increased. Insofar as 14 Note, emergence is not the equivalent of value-maximization, it simply means that the firm has survived.
It is possible that managers of distressed firms may prefer inefficient continuation as opposed to liquidation (see Bradley and Rosenzweig, 1992) . Our presumption here is that reorganizations are better outcomes than liquidations from the perspective of the firm's senior creditors.
firm types and characteristics can affect the likelihood of emergence we control for these characteristics in our regressions.
A prepackaged filing is almost always accompanied by a plan of reorganization that has been accepted by all existing claim classes. This generally ensures that such firms will emerge from the reorganization process and do so fairly quickly. Further, one might argue that where Chapter 11 filing is prompted by the need to obtain DIP financing, it is likely to be a prepackaged filing. Hence we exclude prepackaged filings from our sample. We also exclude the control variable POST1992 as no exogenous change in the bankruptcy law during the sample period predicts that the probability of emergence or the length of the reorganization period should be related to the timing of the Chapter 11 filing. However, including this variable (or excluding it from the earlier Probit) does not materially affect our results as discussed later in the robustness section. Table 4 , panel A shows the results of the Probit model. We report both the coefficients as well as the change in probability associated with a -1/2 to +1/2 standard deviation shift around the mean for continuous variables, and for a change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. As expected, larger firms are more likely to emerge successfully, consistent with the coefficient for LOGASSET being positive and significant. This result is consistent with Carapeto (1999) who also finds that larger firms are more likely to emerge from Chapter 11 (see also Denis and Rodgers, 2002) .
Leverage shows up as positive and marginally significant in our regressions while the coefficient for current assets is negative and significant. One possible explanation for these results is that the nature of assets can affect the probability of emerging from bankruptcy. A larger proportion of current total assets implies that the liquidation value of such a firm is likely to be higher, as current assets have lower liquidity costs as compared to fixed assets. This is especially true if the distress is caused by industry-wide problems (e.g. Pulvino, 1999 , who provides evidence that airline companies in distress consistently received significantly lower prices on sale of aircrafts compared to prices received by healthy industry counterparts). Evidence that firms with more current assets is less likely to emerge is also consistent with the argument that current assets are easier to divert for other purposes (e.g. Myers and
Rajan, 1998) as compared to fixed assets.
Our main interest is in the sign of the coefficient for the DIP variable. The results
show that it is positive and significant at the 5% level. Economically, the increasing probability of emergence associated with a change in the DIP variable from 0 to 1 is also large at 13%, and bigger than any of the other variables. Thus, firms that obtain DIP financing are more likely to emerge successfully.
However, we need to take into account some additional econometric issues. From our Probit regression we know that DIP financed firms are marked by certain characteristics such as large asset size, large current assets to total assets, and is more typical in the retail industry. In other words the independent variable i.e., the DIP dummy is endogenous and is a function of known characteristics. When the independent variable is endogenous and a function of known characteristics, the coefficients in a linear regression are inconsistent. One way of controlling for this is to form a control group. However, the limitations of forming a control group are well known. Not only are the criteria subjective, there is also a loss of sample size issue regarding how much one can reduce the matching criteria limits and still retain an adequate sample size. Another way to address this issue econometrically is through selectivity methods (see Maddala, 1983; Greene, 1997 , Lee, 1979 , Gande et al., 1997  and Puri 1996 for some applications). This is the technique that we adopt in this paper.
Suppose the DIP financing decision is a Probit determined by z i 'b+0 i where z i is the vector of observable factors, which are considered significant in determining 22 whether the firm receives DIP financing. We are interested in estimating the effect of DIP financing on a variable, say y i by estimating
Because DIP financing is endogenous, there is a correlation between 0 i and u i, causing the coefficient estimates to be inconsistent. Under the assumption that 0 i is normally distributed (0,F 2 ), we can replace the dummy variable DIP in the equation (3) by the inverse mills ratio, which is the conditional expectation of 0 i given the DIP financing decision. The significance and the sign of the inverse mills ratio tells us whether, after taking observable factors into account, DIP financing still makes a difference to y i . This technique filters out the effect of firm characteristics which lead to higher probability of reorganization, and which also contribute to the endogenous decision to grant DIP financing.
To implement this technique we use a two-step method. In the first step we estimate a Probit equation with DIP financing as the dependent variable, as in equation (1). We use the estimates of the Probit equation to form the inverse mills ratio, which we then plug into the second step regression. The second step regression is as in equation (2) but now with an additional independent variable called DIPLAMDA, which represents the inverse mills ratio, along with all other variables that may directly affect the time to resolution. Table 4 , panel B shows the selectivityadjusted results, which are very similar to our previous results. This tells us that after taking observable factors into account and adjusting for the endogeneity of the DIP financing variable, is still a significant determinant of emergence from bankruptcy.
As a robustness check, in unreported regressions, we also redo the estimation as a maximum likelihood bivariate Probit and obtain very similar results. All combined, these results suggest that DIP financing is positively related to the probability of emergence from bankruptcy.
As discussed in section 3, DIP financing is less likely to lead to overinvestment if an inside lender provides this financing. This implies a higher likelihood of emergence for these firms compared to those financed by an outsider. If there is little systematic overinvestment, there should be no significant differences in the likelihood of emergence for inside and outside DIP financed firms. We run a Probit model specification of the following form:
SAME is equal to one if the DIP financing was provided by the existing lender and zero otherwise. We find that the coefficient for the dummy variable SAME is negative but not significant (the results are not reported but are available on request from the authors). We re-estimate the Probit adjusting for selectivity bias, and the results remain largely unchanged. This suggests that both inside and outside DIP financiers tend to fund positive NPV projects with higher likelihood of emergence from the bankruptcy process.
Relationship between DIP financing and speed of bankruptcy resolution
We test whether DIP financing is associated with shorter time to resolution, both for emergence from Chapter 11 and for unsuccessful outcomes or liquidations. We estimate a regression of the following form:
RESOLPRD i is the resolution period, defined as the number of days from the date of the Chapter 11 filing to the date on which the firm's plan of reorganization is confirmed by the court, or alternatively the date on which the court approved a plan of liquidation or a major asset sale. All firms for which resolution and its timing is known are included in this analysis, while prepackaged bankruptcies are excluded.
We also exclude firms for which we do not yet have an outcome. In our sample there are a number of firms for which a resolution date was not available at the time of our research (June 30, 1999) . For these firms it is reasonable to assume a positive probability of emergence from the reorganization process. Our data is right censored, and we take this censoring into account by running a censored normal regression taking the upper censoring to be June 30, 1999 . This is similar to a standard Tobit regression that is typically left censored at zero (though the censoring can be at different limits). Table 5 , panel A provides the results of this regression. We find that the coefficient for DIP is negative and significant. Economically, the coefficient for DIP is larger than any of the other independent variables. This is consistent with the argument that DIP lending helps identify or facilitate a faster resolution. It is also consistent with our earlier results from the Probit tests which found that firms with a higher probability of emerging from bankruptcy are more likely to obtain DIP financing.
We run robustness checks to address some issues in estimation. In particular, we correct the regression for selectivity bias, since the DIP dummy variable is endogenous. Replacing the DIP dummy in the regression by the inverse mills ratio (estimated from the Probit) corrects for this bias. The results are reported in Table 5 , panel B and are quite similar to those reported in panel A. It appears that larger firms spend less time in Chapter 11 but they are also more likely to obtain DIP financing.
We are interested in the marginal effect of DIP, and find that DIP lending occurs for firms where the reorganization period is shorter, after taking the size of the firms' assets into account. Bootstrapped standard errors give similar results with significance at 1%. The results suggest that after accounting for endogeneity, DIP financing still significantly reduces the time to emergence.
We also test how DIP financing relates to time to liquidation. In this case, we examine only those firms for which the outcome was liquidation, conversion to
Chapter 7 or substantial asset sales. We estimate the effect of DIP financing on the time to liquidation. As in earlier tests, we run a regression both with and without selectivity corrections, which are reported in Table 5 , panels C and D respectively.
We find that within firms that liquidate, larger firms take longer to liquidate, perhaps because of coordination problems. For our purpose we are interested in the effect of DIP financing on time to liquidation, and we find in both estimations, with and without selectivity corrections, that DIP financing is associated with a statistically significant shorter time to liquidation. Further, the economic effect of such financing is larger than any of the other independent variables in our regressions. There are two possible interpretations for these results. The first interpretation is that DIP financing is value-creating since if the investment does not do well, the DIP financier facilitates a fast liquidation and prevents further value loss (caused by asset deterioration and other direct and indirect costs of financial distress). An alternative interpretation is that claims of other creditors are impaired by the forced fire sale of assets in liquidation, while the DIP lender is able to fully recover loans due to their superpriority status. However, the second interpretation is not consistent with the event study evidence in Chatterjee et al. (1997) , which shows that existing debtholders gain when DIP financing is announced. Hence it would appear that faster liquidation (and faster emergence) is one of the channels through which existing claimholders gain when a DIP financier comes in. The faster liquidation result, in particular, also suggests a more active monitoring role of the DIP lender as opposed to a pure screening role alone.
Insiders vs. outsiders
We estimate the regression for the dependent variable RESOLPRD for the sample of firms that received DIP financing and did not file a prepackaged Chapter 11. We test for the impact of the lender's identity by including the dummy variable SAME as an independent variable. Standard errors are adjusted as in Greene (1997) and Maddala (1983) . Our results reported in Table 6 , panel A show that SAME is significant at 10%, providing some empirical support for the assertion that firms obtaining DIP financing from existing lenders tend to emerge from Chapter 11 more quickly than firms obtaining DIP financing from a new lender. Results after correcting for selectivity bias are similar and are reported in Table 6 , panel B. This is consistent with the notion that insiders have the incentives and private information necessary to identify and facilitate faster emergence from bankruptcy.
We next test whether inside DIP is also associated with reduced time in bankruptcy for the unsuccessful outcomes, i.e. liquidations. For firms that are liquidated, we run regressions similar to those described above. The results are reported in Table 6 , panels C and D. We find that inside DIP is associated with a significantly faster time in liquidation than outside DIP. Combined with earlier results, this suggests that inside DIP financiers identify and/or facilitate reduced time in bankruptcy for both successful emergences as well as liquidations. This could be due to the two differences between an insider and an outsider discussed earlier (insider's larger exposure and better information). These differences can provide stronger incentives to an inside lender to bring the Chapter 11 process to a close, in one way or another, as quickly as possible.
Robustness Checks
In this section we conduct some additional robustness checks. First, we explore the role played by the degree of complexity of capital structure in the reorganization process of the firm. Gilson et al. (1990) document a positive relationship between simplicity of capital structure and a firm's ability to reorganize privately. We collect data on the creditor classes in bankruptcy. This information is available for about 50% of the firms in our sample. We re-estimate specifications in which we include the number of creditor classes as an independent variable. The results are very similar.
In our tests of the relationship between DIP financing and a firm's reorganization process, we presented results for the subsample of firms that did not file a prepackaged Chapter 11. This was done to eliminate the well-documented (Tashijian et al. 1996) findings that prepackaged filings always lead to successful emergence of the filing firm. Since a creditor-approved plan of reorganization is a key feature of a prepackaged filing, the time spent in reorganization is significantly shorter for such filings. We re-estimated our results for the entire sample (prepackaged and nonprepackaged filings) and included a dummy variable for prepackaged filings. The results are very similar to those reported earlier. Rohman (1990) and Rizzi (1991) discuss the special attraction of retail firms to DIP lenders and how retailers have a higher demand for DIP financing. Hence we include a dummy variable for the retail industry in our model specification. As a robustness check, we rerun our regressions using 2-digit SIC codes as dummy variables instead of the retail industry dummy. The results are qualitatively similar.
Finally, we use a POST1992 dummy in Table 3 . As a robustness check we rerun these regressions using a POST1994 dummy and find qualitatively similar results.
Further, in the Probit tests estimating the likelihood of emergence from bankruptcy, we had excluded the POST1992 dummy as a control variable because we felt there was no significant change in the bankruptcy law or economic reason to include this as a control. However, insofar as there is a growth in DIP financing in the POST1992 period, one might argue that there is a case for the inclusion of such a dummy.
Accordingly, we re-estimate our Probit tests including the POST1992 dummy as a control variable. The results are very similar.
Conclusion
There is a major debate in the law and economics literature focusing on the efficacy of DIP financing. Opponents of DIP financing argue that allowing borrowing on terms of superior priority and security adversely affects the existing claims of a firm's creditors, as it may encourage investment in risky and possibly negative NPV projects. Supporters, on the other hand, argue that DIP financing has a more positive role, benefiting all stakeholders by allowing the firm to undertake positive NPV projects. A related question is whether DIP financing prolongs or shortens the time in bankruptcy.
To examine these questions we collect a large sample of firms that filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. We find that DIP financing is associated with a higher probability of emergence as well as a shorter time in bankruptcy (both for firms that reorganize and for firms that liquidate). These results are consistent with DIP lenders playing a screening role in which they fund firms with positive NPV projects, and/or a monitoring role in which they facilitate a successful outcome for firms that they finance, and help speed up the ultimate outcome (whether emergence or liquidation).
We also examine whether the identity of the DIP financier -whether a prior lender (insider) or a new lender (outsider) -makes a difference on any of these dimensions. We find that smaller firms tend to obtain DIP financing from their existing lenders. This is consistent with prior lenders having private information about these firms, which gives them a comparative advantage in providing DIP financing to smaller, more information-sensitive firms. We find that inside DIP financing is significantly associated with reduced time in bankruptcy, both for firms that emerge from Chapter 11 and firms that liquidate.
Overall, our evidence suggests that whether DIP financiers identify firms with positive NPV projects and/or facilitate successful outcomes, and can facilitate a reduced time in bankruptcy. Interestingly, the results on faster bankruptcy resolution hold for both successful (emerge from Chapter 11) and unsuccessful (liquidation)
outcomes. The effect of reduced time in bankruptcy for the firm is strengthened when the DIP lender also has a prior lending relationship with the firm. Table 3 Characteristics of Firms Obtaining DIP Financing
The Table below presents the results of Probit regressions. LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the latest year before the firm's filing for Chapter 11. LEVERAGE is the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. RETAIL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's primary SIC code is between 5200 and 5999. PREPAK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm filed a prepackaged Chapter 11. POST1992 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the filing took place in the second half of the sample period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) . CA/TA is the ratio of current assets to total assets for the firm. In panel A the dependent variable is 1 if the firm filing for Chapter 11 received DIP financing and 0 otherwise. In panel B the Probit is run in the sub-sample of firms that obtained DIP financing. The dependent variable is 1 if the firm filing for Chapter 11 received DIP financing from one of its prior lenders, and 0 otherwise. Columns 3 and 6 show the change in probability associated with a -1/2F to 1/2F shift around the mean of the continuous variables, holding all other variables constant at their mean. For dummy variables these columns report the change in probability associated with a change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. Chapter 11 either emerged as an independent firm or was acquired or merged with another firm, and is equal to 0 if the firm's filing was converted to Chapter 7, or the firm was liquidated, or there is no information available. Prepackaged bankruptcies are excluded. LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets, as reported for the latest year before the firm's filing for Chapter 11. LEVERAGE is the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by book value of total assets. RETAIL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's primary SIC code is between 5200 and 5999. CA/TA is the ratio of current assets to total assets for the firm. DIP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm obtained DIP financing and 0 otherwise. Columns 3 and 6 show the change in probability associated with a -1/2F to 1/2F shift around the mean of the continuous variables, holding all other variables constant at their mean. For dummy variables these columns report the change in probability associated with a change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
Panel
Panel B: Estimates after adjusting for selectivity bias The model estimated is similar to the one in Panel A with the DIP variable being replaced by DIPLAMDA. DIPLAMDA is the inverse mills ratio formed using estimates obtained from the Probit regression in this subsample where DIP is the dependent variable and the independent variables are same as those in Table 3 . 
Time to Emergence
In panel A, the dependent variable is the length of the resolution period for the Chapter 11 filing firm defined as the number of days from the date of Chapter 11 filing to the date of the resolution of its reorganization process. The sample does not include filings resulting in liquidation, substantial asset sales or conversion to Chapter 7. Prepackaged bankruptcies are also excluded. LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the latest year before the firm's filing for Chapter 11. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total book value of liabilities divided by book value of total assets. RETAIL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's primary SIC code is between 5200 and 5999. CA/TA is the ratio of current assets to total assets for the firm. DIP is 1 if the firm received DIP financing and 0 otherwise. The model includes the firms for which no resolution date is available. Thus the reorganization process for these firms is taken to be right censored as of 6/30/99. Panel B estimates the same regression after adjusting for selectivity bias, with the independent variable DIP being replaced by DIPLAMDA. DIPLAMDA is the inverse mills ratio formed using estimates obtained from the Probit regression in this subsample where DIP is the dependent variable and the independent variables are same as in those 
Time to Liquidation
In panel C the dependent variable is the length of the resolution period for the Chapter 11 filing firm defined as the number of days from the date of Chapter 11 filing to the date of the resolution of its reorganization process. Unlike panel A, the sample includes only filings resulting in liquidation, substantial asset sales or conversion to Chapter 7. The independent variables used are the same as those in panel A. Panel D estimates the same model as panel C, adjusting for selectivity bias, with the independent variable DIP being replaced by DIPLAMDA. DIPLAMDA is the inverse mills ratio formed using estimates obtained from the Probit regression in this subsample where DIP is the dependent variable and the independent variables are same as those in 0.040 *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% Table 6 Inside DIP Financing and Speed of Resolution
Time to Emergence
In panel A, the dependent variable is the length of the resolution period for the Chapter 11 filing firm defined as the number of days from the date of Chapter 11 filing to the date of the resolution of its reorganization process. The sample does not include filings resulting in liquidation, substantial asset sales or conversion to Chapter 7. Prepackaged bankruptcies are also excluded. LOGASSET is the natural log of the book value of total assets as reported for the latest year before the firm's filing for Chapter 11. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total book value of liabilities divided by book value of total assets. RETAIL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's primary SIC code is between 5200 and 5999. CA/TA is the ratio of current assets to total assets for the firm. SAME is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm received DIP financing from one of its prepetition creditors and 0 otherwise. Panel B estimates the same model adjusting for selectivity bias, with the independent variable SAME being replaced by SAMELAMDA. SAMELAMDA is the inverse mills ratio formed using estimates obtained from the Probit regression in this subsample where SAME is the dependent variable and the independent variables are the same as those in Table 3 . The regressions are run within the sample of DIP financed firms. 
Panel
Time to Liquidation
In panel C the dependent variable is the length of the resolution period for the Chapter 11 filing firm defined as the number of days from the date of Chapter 11 filing to the date of the resolution of its reorganization process. The sample includes only filings that resulted in liquidation, substantial asset sales or conversion to Chapter 7. Independent variables used are the same as in panel A. Panel D estimates the same model as panel C, adjusting for selectivity bias, with the independent variable SAME being replaced by SAMELAMDA. SAMELAMDA is the inverse mills ratio formed using estimates obtained from the Probit regression in this subsample where SAME is the dependent variable and the independent variables are the same as those in 0.147 *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
